Iraq Sanctions Hit Wrong Target
Iraq Sanctions Hit Wrong Target
By Steve Pickering
May 1998
Volume 35 Number 4
Sanctions have often been hailed as the nonviolent alternative to war. When political relations are strained, we, in, these enlightened times, resort to limits on trade, rather than all out combat, and then safely forget that any tension exists. Indeed, sanctions are not considered a form of warfare: no troops are injured or killed, so the parallel cannot be drawn. But somewhere down the line an important fact was forgotten: sanctions don’t always work. They need to be used in an appropriate and carefully targeted manner. Most importantly of all, there needs to be a clear objective for using them in the first place. This is where the issue of Iraq comes into question. As we shall see, the sanctions imposed upon Iraq have done great damage to the Iraqi people, but not Saddam Hussein’s regime.
We need to ask an important question: why are sanctions being used against Iraq? The two stock answers often given are (a) because Iraq is in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions, and (b) because Hussein is a brutal dictator who is bad for the people of his country. Sanctions must, therefore, be used as tools to remedy these two problems. Here we run into a difficulty which is central to the problem of sanctions in Iraq. If Hussein is a brutal dictator, he must, by definition, be indifferent to the suffering of his people. If sanctions make the situation for the ordinary Iraqi worse, then Hussein is unlikely to change his policies.
In a climate of advanced political motivation, such as in South Africa, sanctions can work. When used with the consent of the people, and when the sanctions affect the rulers as well as the ruled, we have a recipe for success. But Iraq does not have a vocal opposition, and its people do not approve of the use of sanctions. It is often assumed that the imposition of sanctions will lead to resentment of Hussein and the possibility of his ousting. This, of course, ignores the lack of political dissent in Iraq. Indeed, quite the opposite has occurred: sanctions have led to a resentment of the international community which imposes them, and a subsequent bolstering of the support for Saddam Hussein, the firm leader in times of trouble. Meanwhile, Hussein continues his Machiavellian redistribution of food to the people who like him. In an environment with one leader who gives out food to people who support him politically, and denies it to those who do not, it is hardly surprising that Iraq does not have much in the way of internal political opposition.
There seems to be a lack of focus on what the sanctions in Iraq are actually supposed to achieve. The removal of Hussein? Unlikely. This would hardly seem to be an ideal tactic for his removal. Forcing Hussein’s government to comply with UN Resolutions? Again, unlikely. Using restrictions on trade against a regime that is more concerned with building palaces than providing food and medical aid to its people is once more not the most direct of routes. The recent threat of bombing may have had more of an effect on Hussein’s thinking towards Security Council Resolution 687 (the Resolution which set up the UN Special Commission, UNSCOM, and gave it the power to inspect Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities), but once again, the humanitarian aspect was completely ignored. Bombing, like the sanctions, would have injured and killed innocent Iraqi people, not their leader.
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has argued that the sanctions have been used in such a way as to directly affect Saddam Hussein. In an article he wrote for The Guardian, dated February 20, 1998, he stated: “Ever since sanctions were first imposed, Britain has led efforts to make sure that the impact on the Iraqi people was minimized, and that the impact on the regime was maximized.” At a press conference in January, Mr. Cook pointed out that: “The reality is Saddam Hussein hates the oil-for-food program because it takes away from him the alibi that it is the Iraqi people that are being made to suffer by the international community. He would rather have his people suffering as a propaganda weapon.” (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Press conference, 31 January 1998)
This may indeed be the case, but here we have the implicit acceptance of two facts: first, that the sanctions are hurting the Iraqi people, and second, that Saddam Hussein does not care, with the obvious ramification that no amount of sanctions will have an effect on him. Whether we blame the suffering of the Iraqi people on the international community for imposing the sanctions, or on Saddam Hussein for exacerbating the situation by refusing to comply with UN Resolutions, and by redistributing proceeds for the oil-for-food program to his own benefit, is unimportant. The fact remains that the people of Iraq are suffering. Both the sanctions and Hussein have created this suffering. Does the international community want to remove Saddam Hussein? Doubtful. Driven by a ‘better the devil you know’ attitude, there seems to be a certain willingness to accept Hussein, as Edward Mortimer, foreign editor of the Financial Times points out: “I sense we are settling back into a situation where Saddam just becomes another of those tiresome regimes that one had to do business with.” (INDICT Factpack, from 15 January 1997 Associated Press article.)
It is unclear what the objectives of the sanctions are. But it does seem clear that the suffering of the Iraqi people is not high in the minds of either Saddam Hussein or of the rest of the world.
Steve Pickering was an intern at the Washington Peace Center.
By Steve Pickering
May 1998
Volume 35 Number 4
Sanctions have often been hailed as the nonviolent alternative to war. When political relations are strained, we, in, these enlightened times, resort to limits on trade, rather than all out combat, and then safely forget that any tension exists. Indeed, sanctions are not considered a form of warfare: no troops are injured or killed, so the parallel cannot be drawn. But somewhere down the line an important fact was forgotten: sanctions don’t always work. They need to be used in an appropriate and carefully targeted manner. Most importantly of all, there needs to be a clear objective for using them in the first place. This is where the issue of Iraq comes into question. As we shall see, the sanctions imposed upon Iraq have done great damage to the Iraqi people, but not Saddam Hussein’s regime.
We need to ask an important question: why are sanctions being used against Iraq? The two stock answers often given are (a) because Iraq is in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions, and (b) because Hussein is a brutal dictator who is bad for the people of his country. Sanctions must, therefore, be used as tools to remedy these two problems. Here we run into a difficulty which is central to the problem of sanctions in Iraq. If Hussein is a brutal dictator, he must, by definition, be indifferent to the suffering of his people. If sanctions make the situation for the ordinary Iraqi worse, then Hussein is unlikely to change his policies.
In a climate of advanced political motivation, such as in South Africa, sanctions can work. When used with the consent of the people, and when the sanctions affect the rulers as well as the ruled, we have a recipe for success. But Iraq does not have a vocal opposition, and its people do not approve of the use of sanctions. It is often assumed that the imposition of sanctions will lead to resentment of Hussein and the possibility of his ousting. This, of course, ignores the lack of political dissent in Iraq. Indeed, quite the opposite has occurred: sanctions have led to a resentment of the international community which imposes them, and a subsequent bolstering of the support for Saddam Hussein, the firm leader in times of trouble. Meanwhile, Hussein continues his Machiavellian redistribution of food to the people who like him. In an environment with one leader who gives out food to people who support him politically, and denies it to those who do not, it is hardly surprising that Iraq does not have much in the way of internal political opposition.
There seems to be a lack of focus on what the sanctions in Iraq are actually supposed to achieve. The removal of Hussein? Unlikely. This would hardly seem to be an ideal tactic for his removal. Forcing Hussein’s government to comply with UN Resolutions? Again, unlikely. Using restrictions on trade against a regime that is more concerned with building palaces than providing food and medical aid to its people is once more not the most direct of routes. The recent threat of bombing may have had more of an effect on Hussein’s thinking towards Security Council Resolution 687 (the Resolution which set up the UN Special Commission, UNSCOM, and gave it the power to inspect Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities), but once again, the humanitarian aspect was completely ignored. Bombing, like the sanctions, would have injured and killed innocent Iraqi people, not their leader.
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has argued that the sanctions have been used in such a way as to directly affect Saddam Hussein. In an article he wrote for The Guardian, dated February 20, 1998, he stated: “Ever since sanctions were first imposed, Britain has led efforts to make sure that the impact on the Iraqi people was minimized, and that the impact on the regime was maximized.” At a press conference in January, Mr. Cook pointed out that: “The reality is Saddam Hussein hates the oil-for-food program because it takes away from him the alibi that it is the Iraqi people that are being made to suffer by the international community. He would rather have his people suffering as a propaganda weapon.” (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Press conference, 31 January 1998)
This may indeed be the case, but here we have the implicit acceptance of two facts: first, that the sanctions are hurting the Iraqi people, and second, that Saddam Hussein does not care, with the obvious ramification that no amount of sanctions will have an effect on him. Whether we blame the suffering of the Iraqi people on the international community for imposing the sanctions, or on Saddam Hussein for exacerbating the situation by refusing to comply with UN Resolutions, and by redistributing proceeds for the oil-for-food program to his own benefit, is unimportant. The fact remains that the people of Iraq are suffering. Both the sanctions and Hussein have created this suffering. Does the international community want to remove Saddam Hussein? Doubtful. Driven by a ‘better the devil you know’ attitude, there seems to be a certain willingness to accept Hussein, as Edward Mortimer, foreign editor of the Financial Times points out: “I sense we are settling back into a situation where Saddam just becomes another of those tiresome regimes that one had to do business with.” (INDICT Factpack, from 15 January 1997 Associated Press article.)
It is unclear what the objectives of the sanctions are. But it does seem clear that the suffering of the Iraqi people is not high in the minds of either Saddam Hussein or of the rest of the world.
Steve Pickering was an intern at the Washington Peace Center.
